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Abstract
Post-colonial states in the Asian region have frequently been subject to
political tensions derived from their multi-ethnic make-up and, what
some have argued to be, the failure of states to adequately represent the
interests of their ethnic minorities. This article will look at examples of
where states in Asia have failed to adequately represent or otherwise
incorporate their ethnic minorities as full and equal citizens. It also
considers the range of responses to such perceived or actual state failure
in adequately incorporating all citizens, including inter-ethnic and racial
violence and separatist conflict. The article will conclude by considering
conceptual and actual models of state organization intended to resolve
racial and ethnic tensions in the Asian region.
Keywords: Ethnicity; post-colonialism; state; authoritarianism; civics; democracy.
Introduction
This paper explores causal elements in claims to separatism in states
in Southeast and South Asia. It suggests that each shares some
important common elements, key among which is the failure of some
post-colonial states to establish citizenship based on a shared sense of
civic equity, and a consequent retreat to ethnic specificity. It suggests
that a combination of greater civic equity and a higher degree
of regional autonomy may address the separatist claims to which it
refers.
It has been a common experience that post-colonial states in Asia
begin political life, more or less, as united liberal democracies,
but quickly slide into disunity and authoritarianism. There have
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commonly been two processes, often related, by which this has
occurred. Post-colonial states, including in Asia, have frequently
been subject to political tensions derived from elements of their
multi-ethnic or racially-differentiated1 make-up and what some
(although not all) affected minorities have argued to be the failure
of states to adequately represent their interests (see Blanton, Mason
and Athow 2001 in relation to Africa, and Henderson and Singer 2000
regarding Africa and Asia). In some cases, this political tension has
been manifested in claims to a separate political identity, often to a
separate state or other form of autonomous polity.
This paper posits three theoretical propositions. The first proposi-
tion is that there is a political gap between pre-independence
expectations and post-independence realities, which in turn leads to
increased competition for scarce resources in multi-ethnic societies
encouraging ethnically-specific patron-client relations. A common
initial development in newly post-colonial states is that the expecta-
tions of liberation from colonialism, including the redistribution of
previously expropriated wealth, are rarely met. Indeed, it has been a
common experience that not only have post-colonial states not
immediately prospered but that they have suddenly lost expertise
and access to capital and have materially regressed. The second
proposition is that excluded ethnic groups seek redress and, within the
context of limited state capacity, governments frequently resort to
authoritarian tactics (see, for example, Hirschmann 1987 regarding
post-colonial Africa; Cornwell 1999; Englebert 2000; Luis 2000; Feith
2006 regarding the Indonesian experience; also based on the author’s
regular first-hand observations in Timor-Leste in the period 2002
2006).
Competing for scarce or diminished resources, and within the
context of a more, rather than less, authoritarian environment, ethnic
groups compete and receive favours on the basis of ethnicity and
patronage, with less favoured groups retreating with their grievances to
cultural familiarity. Such groups may include those that were
historically more separate or self-identifying to the dominant ethnic
group/s. Because of a sense of separation (for example, the Acehnese in
Indonesia, Southern Muslims in Thailand, Moros in the Philippines),
or a sense of compelled inclusion which relegates them to a sense of
inferior status (such as the Papuans in Indonesia, Tamils in Sri Lanka,
East Timorese in Indonesia, Muslims in Southern Thailand) they have
felt marginalized by or alienated from the dominant group. Such
grievance and retreat to cultural familiarity around which the group
bonds provides the locus of expressions of grievances and protest.
Other ethnic groups might feel a lesser degree of separate identity or
alienation from the dominant group/s, or may have been able to
resolve this sense of separation more positively, in particular through a
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more active sense of national inclusion or more complete state
citizenship.
‘Citizenship’ is used here to mean the born or naturalized
constituent member of a state with equity of rights and duties in
relation to that state. Each of the case studies suggests a similar
understanding of the principles of ‘citizenship’, notably relating to
‘equity’. However, they can vary in whether the loyalty is to an existing
state, a proposed state, or divided between an overarching state and a
local autonomous authority.
The third proposition is that political regression involves the
political identification around ethnic or tribal groups (vertical
distinction, see Smith 1986, p. 87) rather than political identification
around group material interests (Grusky, Manwai and Szelenyi 2008;
also Shavitt et al. 2006). With the latter, parties tend to form around
ideological differences but across the state. With the former, parties
tend to form around ethnic familiarity, often geographically specific
within the state, and within a system of patron-client relations. Both
such political situations have the capacity to challenge basic notions of
citizenship, in which, as part of a social contract in which citizens have
some responsibilities towards the state, the state and its institutions
exist to serve and protect all recognized members of the state equally, if
not always with a full complement of rights.
Reacting against the (ethnically majoritarian, authoritarian) state,
the state in turn reacts, polarizing politico-ethnic difference. Where
such difference has a geographic focus, it may manifest as a specific
‘national’ identity and a related claim for self-determination based on
a new, local claim to a state based on claimed ‘just cause’ (Mikulas
2006; Buchanan 2007, p. 22).
The qualitative methodology employed here is based on participant
observation, primary semi-structured interviews, and discussions with
relevant actors in the field over the previous sixteen years. It also draws
on related experiences from relevant literature. This paper employs
quantitative data only from election outcomes.
In the post-Westphalian era, states have conventionally not accepted
the devolution of sovereignty to a separate body and few attempts to
secede have been successful. When secession arises states have tended
to engage in coercive behaviour, attempting to compel reluctant state
members to accept state inclusion. It is this compulsion that some-
times engenders rejection. Where it otherwise fails, compulsion
generally descends into conflict, in which the dissenting group loses
those practical qualities of citizenship upon which the state bases its
sovereign claim. This practical loss of the qualities of citizenship,
notably equity, apply to the principle case studies of this paper,
including Sri Lanka, Thailand, Indonesia, East Timor, and the
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Philippines, and the districts or territories within them of, respectively,
Eelam, Pattani, Aceh, West Papua, and Mindanao.2
These case studies have been chosen because they share a number of
similarities: each experience(ed) conflicts in which state boundaries
were defined by colonial reach rather than ethnic homogeneity or
‘national’ identity; they each refer(ed) to claims for ethnic/national
separation from the parent state, the groups claiming separation from
the state have claimed or continue to claim a separate national identity
as a key criterion for their own state, and each separatist group feels or
has felt alienated from the state and has claimed state abuses against
the ethnic group they claim to represent.
It should be noted that this discussion does not engage in normative,
much less dichotomous, debates between ‘modernization’ and ‘tradi-
tion’. Rather, it attempts to identify some of the complexities of
nationalist claims in multi-ethnic post-colonial states, in turn identify-
ing alternative conceptions of ‘nation’ and their relative success or
failure in maintaining state unity.
Colonial incorporation
When discussing post-colonial states, the arbitrary formation of the
colonies upon which they are based raises the question of their
artificiality or otherwise, the extent to which they are representative,
and whether or not they adequately address the interests of the people
whose constituency they claim to represent. Similarly, different
political leaders in the region have, at different times, tried to identify
what they regard as the qualities of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ national
membership. To illustrate, the Philippines now holds ‘democracy’ as
a national value (Patino and Velasco 2004), while Indonesia retains its
national ideology of Pancasila (Five Principles) and defines national
membership by acceptance of the military-inspired Negara Kesatuan
Republic Indonesia (Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia). In
2009, during its offensive against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE, or Tamil Tigers), the Sri Lankan defence minister justified
military retribution against Tamil civilians who had been with LTTE
forces on the grounds of their ‘disloyalty’ (Adams 2009). Similarly,
Thailand’s Southern Muslims who also hold Malaysian citizenship or
speak Malay ‘have been persistently accused of disloyalty to the Thai
state’ (BTI 2008, pp. 4-5; The Nation 2006). Specific ideological
requirements associated with such prescriptive loyalty have led to
dissent and political tension. This has especially been the case when
they have been applied to a uniformity of national identity which has
functionally limited pluralism or excluded the participation of ethnic
minorities.
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Anti-colonialism and national identity
The colonial era in Asia established distinct Westphalian-type borders,
which were inherited as a matter of administrative convenience,
regardless of ethnic or national make-up, and were the basis for
claims to post-colonial statehood. National identity in most states, be
it post-colonial or otherwise, tends to cohere around a number of key
features, not all of which are necessary but some of which must exist in
order for the common bond of mutual political identification to exist.
Such features of national identity may include: common language;
shared history or myths; common religion or system of beliefs;
generally contiguous common territory; and an ethnonym (self-
identifying group name) (see Gellner 1983; Smith 1986; Anderson
1991; Connor 1994; Smith 2003). Beyond this, bonds formed of
mutual defence sometimes create commonalities which do not other-
wise exist (which in turn enhance and contribute to communicability,
history/myth, and notions of common territory) (May 2005, p. 1050;
Kingsbury 2007, pp. 513; see also Erikson 1968). Similarly, such
bonds may disappear with the disappearance of the common threat,
for example after a colonising power has been displaced.
Critically, however, it appears that nations that do not come to
cohere around more sophisticated qualities than an essentialist
ethnicity tend to become exclusivist, inwardly focused, and often
externally hostile (see Nairn 1981, pp. 3478). Modern political
societies are constituted less around ethnicity or pre-existing ‘common
characteristics’ and more around a common core of civic character-
istics, including legal equity, civil and political rights and representa-
tive, participatory, transparent, and accountable government. In that
these civic characteristics are said to reflect a universal good (if not
universal application), an espousal of these is referred to as ‘civic
cosmopolitanism’ or ‘civic nationalism’. That is, citizens of a state can
transcend ethnic difference and cohere around a sense of civic
nationalism, understood as a commitment to common or ‘national’
identity based on a commitment to core civic principles such as
representative and accountable government and equitable rule of law
(see O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, pp. 7-8; Miller 1993; Miller 1995;
Smith 1998, pp. 210-13; Kingsbury 2007, pp. 37, 402, 56).
Where these features do not exist, where they exist in truncated
form, or where they exist separately, e.g., separate language groups
with distinct histories in their own contiguous areas, the bonds of
mutual political identification will often have not previously existed,
are more difficult to establish, and may be predicated upon criteria
that is impermanent. To illustrate, culturally-diverse if geographically-
proximate peoples who have a common enemy may come together for
the purpose of defeating that enemy. The mutual identification around
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that cause and the social organization required to address it can in
itself constitute the basis for the formation of political bonds.
This last point is not only important in the formation of national
identity but, in many cases, is central to such identity, not least in the
case of struggles for self-determination as exemplified by anti-colonial
or post-colonial separatist movements, most of which explicitly
identify themselves as ‘National’ within their titles. This claim to
self-determination around the issue of national identity is identified as
a ‘right’ which, under international law, in turn (if in a self-referential
manner) legitimizes such a war for self-determination (see Malanczuk
1997). What is important in the claim to national identity is twofold: a)
the determination about its status being made by those people in
question; and b) the distinction between the idea of ‘nation’ and the
idea of ‘state’ as conceptual and functional entities which may or may
not coincide, and the tensions that might reasonably exist where they
do not so coincide. Once that threat has been resolved, the rationale
for association can disappear, particularly if there are not significant
shared advantages or there are perceived disadvantages in retaining
political bonds.
Tensions within post-colonial states
In addition to their relatively arbitrary colonial-era-inspired borders,
post-colonial states have been characterized by reduced state capacity
following decolonization.3 In short, the financial and material cost of
waging wars of decolonization and the loss of an experienced
bureaucracy following decolonization have led to reduced state
capacity. In circumstances in which independence from colonialism
has often been couched in terms of the material benefits of liberation,
the reduction in material welfare of newly-liberated peoples often
created new sets of challenges for less experienced post-colonial
governments (Henderson and Singer 2000; personal observation in
Indonesia 19922005, Philippines 19972009, and Timor-Leste 2002
2010).
The disappointment and sometimes desperation bred by such
material diminution created further sets of tensions. Independence
leaders with access to limited state resources have found themselves
pressured to buy off key political or ethnic support groups, often in a
type of continuation of more traditional patron-client relations
(Eisenstadt and Roniger 1980). As a consequence, groups without
access to resources or the patronage likely to produce resources were
more likely to become alienated from the new state. Where that lack of
patronage or alienation was defined along ethnic lines, cleavages arose
or were exacerbated. This was especially the case where there had been
a colonial-era objection to being incorporated into the colony (for
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example, Aceh, Pattani, and Mindanao) and reluctance or opposition
to being incorporated into the post-colonial state (such as West Papua
and Timor-Leste).
Although often drawing on the rhetoric of liberal democracy (or
Marxism) as an ideology rationalizing the liberation struggle, when
confronted with the combined task of defining the post-colonial state
and running it in a reduced capacity, some post-colonial political
leaders either implicitly or explicitly drew on interpretations of pre-
colonial political traditions, including consensus, respect, and obedi-
ence. Faced with dissent from alienated groups, the state can become
intolerant, close political space, and functionally lock dissident groups
out of state participation. These combined phenomena were present
in: Sri Lanka from 1956; Indonesia from 1957, and especially from
1966; in the Philippines notably between 1946 and 1954 and again
between 1972 and 1986; and in Timor-Leste increasingly between 2003
and 2006. Where groups were identified by ethnic allegiance, states
commonly diminished their practical status as citizens with full and
equal legal rights. By way of illustration, East Timorese were targeted
by the Indonesian military on a wholesale basis in the period between
1975 and 1978 (Dunn 1996, pp. 27583), West Papuan resistance
leaders have claimed indiscriminate attacks (personal conversations
20052009; see also Prai 2000; Grusky, Manwai and Szelenyi 2008),
and ethnic Tamils were excluded from much public life due to the 1956
Sinhalese language policy and further claimed they were indiscrimi-
nately targeted, especially towards the end of the Eelam war in May
2009 (McDonald 2009). Gerakan Acheh Merdeka (GAM), or Free
Aceh Movement, similarly claimed indiscriminate attacks, particularly
in the late 1990s.4
Group identity
Group identity tends to evolve, as noted, around either ethnic or civic
bases. Where civic values, such as a commitment to representative and
accountable government and equitable and consistent rule of law, have
never been well developed, where they have been weakened, or where
they have been systematically disassembled (for example, Indonesia in
1966, Sri Lanka in 20072009, Thailand in 20012006, and the
Philippines in 19721986), group identity tends to retreat to that which
is common, known, or culturally understood, notably around lan-
guage, as a bond of social psychology (Kelman 1997; Allott 1998).
Within this retreat to the ethnically specific, there are two further
broad categories: being ethnically dominant or aggressive (national
chauvinism), and ethnically defensive. It is important to note that
ethnic group defensiveness does not reflect the opposite of chauvinism
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or imply a retreat from specific identity, but rather a retreat to and
strengthening of that identity as a bond of mutual assurance.
In terms of group response, based on the author’s field research,5
social groups coming from more parochial backgrounds tend to
respond in similar ways to external exposure. Such backgrounds can
include those that have had no contact with external (including
colonial) influences and those that have had limited contact with
external influences. This in turn influences how they address issues of
social and organizational change, both in relation to themselves and in
relation to both dominant groups and subject groups.
In cases where there has been greater positive external exposure,
based on personal observation in the field in each of the case studies
presented here, it appears there has been a greater tendency to
accepting or endorsing cosmopolitan pluralism. This has also been
seen in the political rhetoric of a number of anti-colonial and
immediate post-colonial political leaders who had been educated in
external environments, and among indigenous, pre-modern peoples
who have been exposed to more benign external influences, such as
multilateral aid organizations. In such cases, there is a greater openness
to more fully developed and equitable civic values, for example, among
East Timorese who have been educated abroad and among East
Timorese who have worked with or been heavily exposed to the UN or
aid agencies; among members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF) who have negotiated within international forums; within Aceh
among the political leadership as well as among many more ordinary
Acehnese who had been exposed to international forums and external
intervention; among better educated Tamils; and among West Papuans
who have been educated or continue to live abroad.6
Based on the case studies it appears that the greater the negative
external exposure by traditional ethnic groups, the greater the
tendency to ethnic specificity or exclusivity. While there are numerous
examples of positive exposure, there are significantly more illustrations
of the consequences of negative exposure, such as the imposition of
arbitrary colonial authority or repression or ethnic or religious
majoritarianism. Examples of negative colonial authority or attack
apply in each of the case studies, while religious distinction manifested
as discrimination can also be said to apply in each of the case studies.
Interlocutors from each of the case studies also claimed to have been
subject to ethnic majoritarianism.
In circumstances where there is less external exposure, such as in
remote parts of Timor-Leste, there is a tendency towards cultural
reification, depending on the extent of that exposure. Responses can
range from largely ignoring external influences (remote areas of West
Papua), constructing them as diminishing and hence reasserting that
which is lulik (‘sacred’, Timor-Leste) or reinforcing and further
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clarifying that which is internal or ‘local’ as opposed to that which is
foreign or external (elements of Aceh, Pattani, and Mindanao).7
Notably among more isolated ethnic groups such as in Viqueque,
Timor-Leste, and more broadly among Sri Lanka’s Tamils of the
Jaffna Peninsula or the Bangsamoro of Mindanao, when confronted
with difference or roused to defence, the more parochial the world
view of the inhabitants, the greater the tendency towards conflict with
other ‘national’ groups.
In the case of Viqueque, in Timor-Leste,8 the period when the
people both within Viqueque and Timor-Leste had the highest degree
of unity was during the Indonesian occupation, with an imposed
external focus enhancing local unity. Similarly, once Sri Lanka’s
independence was achieved and Tamil’s minority status was increas-
ingly contrasted against Sinhalese chauvinism, this quickly led to
division and conflict. When Sri Lanka’s army commander General
Sarath Fonseka said, ‘I strongly believe that this country belongs to
the Sinhalese’ (in Hussain 2009), explaining that ethnic minorities ‘can
live in this country with us’ but could not ‘demand undue things’, he
was imposing an ethnic majoritarian view of national organization.
Similarly, Indonesia’s Acehnese were active contributors to the war for
independence, but quickly became disenchanted with their reduced
status following that war, leading to rebellion against the state (see
Kell 1995; Reid 2004), while those in West Papua were arbitrarily
incorporated into the post-colonial state (Chauvel 2006). ‘Even if
those making noises number up to a million,’ said Indonesia’s General
Ryzmizard Ryacudu in a familiar majoritarian manner, ‘this is a
country of more than 220 million people. . . . Issues of justice, religion,
autonomy, social welfare, education  those are not the Indonesian
military’s problems’ (Emmerson 2005, p. 38).
In other cases, such as the Philippines’ Mindanao and Thailand’s
Pattani, their respective inhabitants were arbitrarily incorporated into
the post-colonial state. In the case of Pattani, Siam occupied the
sultanate in the late seventeenth century and, following the breakdown
of the Siamese state, resumed suzerainty from the mid eighteenth
century, creating five new provinces from the one sultanate (Pattani,
Narathiwat, Songkhla, Satun, and Yala). However, Pattani had greater
commonality with the other Malay Muslim states of the Malay
Peninsula. When in 1909 the United Kingdom and Thailand agreed to
dissect the Malay Peninsula, Siam was allowed to retain the five
provinces created from the Sultanate of Pattani. The residents of
Pattani objected, not least because of the subsequent Thai policy of
requiring Pattani residents to speak Thai, as well as ascribing
Buddhism as the state religion.
The Muslim peoples of Mindanao had similarly lived in indepen-
dent sultanates, notably Sulu and Maguindanao, until the advent of
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Spanish and then American colonialism, to which they refused to
concede, having been engaged in a more or less continuous battle
against outsiders since the early seventeenth century. The colonial
policy of settling Christian Visayans in Mindanao from the early
twentieth century further displaced and alienated katawhang lumad
(indigenous peoples). Mindanao Muslims continue to resist central
government authority under various guises, including recently as the
Moro9 National Liberation Front (MNLF), the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF), and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Attempts
at reaching peace agreements have been partially successful. Notably,
a peace agreement between the government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the MNLF in September 1996 unravelled as a result of
poor implementation and legislative and executive manipulation, with
the agreement formally collapsing in 2001 (May 2002). A subsequent
peace agreement with the MILF in 2008 foundered on legal appeal.
Status of case studies
Timor-Leste is arguably the state that has experienced the most
extended forms of ‘national’ division, having first achieved indepen-
dence from Indonesia in September 1999 and being formally granted
independent status in May 2002. Its electoral processes of 1999, 2001,
and 2007 have each been marked by an exceptionally high voter turn-
out10 and, following near state failure based on politically-manipu-
lated inter-ethnic rivalries in 2006 (number twenty on the Failed State
Index 2007, or as a ‘failed state’, based on 2006 criteria), its elections
of 2007 saw democratic change and consolidation, if with a period of
post-election violence. In 2008, Timor-Leste began preparing for a
programme of decentralization and devolution of political and
economic decision-making. This addressed both the limited absorptive
capacity of, and economic distribution within, the state, in turn being
a key contributor to political tensions, as well as recognizing local
political identity.
Aceh had similarly evolved from its status as a reluctant inclusion
within the Indonesian state, less completely if perhaps in a more
practical manner given its international legal circumstances. Having
been a part of the original Republic of Indonesia, Aceh could not
claim under international law that it had been illegally occupied after
the fact of independence. GAM’s political leaders continued to claim
that Aceh had participated in Indonesia’s war of independence in
order to assert its own independence, although a closer reading shows
that Aceh’s political leadership more accurately wanted a higher level
of autonomy within the post-independence state, rather than inde-
pendence as such. In many respects, the autonomy that GAM agreed
to in August 2005, and which was subsequently widely accepted by the
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Acehnese people, fulfilled much of the territory’s original claims. The
creation of local political parties in an otherwise ‘national’ political
party framework allowed for the development of expressions of
genuinely local political views, while there was also direct control
over a large proportion of the Aceh budget.11
In Mindanao, following the earlier peace agreement with the
MNLF, the MILF succeeded in winning significant, if yet to be
granted, concessions from the central government on an autonomous
‘Bangsamoro’ (Moro Nation) homeland on 5 August 2008. However,
the ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Ancestral Domain’ (MOA-
AD) to create a self-governing autonomous region (MOA-AD 2008)
was overturned by the Philippines’ Supreme Court on 14 October 2008
on the grounds that it was held to be unconstitutional. The MOA-AD,
as the first part of a larger peace agreement including the establish-
ment of a ‘juridicial entity’, like the 1996 agreement recognized the
original self-governing status of the Bangsamoro people and in
principle legitimized their political grievances.
The situation for ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka deteriorated from mid-
2006, and in 2009 the Sinhalese-dominated government of President
Mahinda Rajapaksa launched a full-scale offensive which, in May
2009, defeated the LTTE. Having failed to militarily win a separate
state and refusing to negotiate a compromise agreement,12 the LTTE’s
military claim to a separate state was crushed. Having won a military
victory and riding a wave of Sinhalese popularity, the Sri Lanka
government appeared disinterested in finding a political solution to
the ethnic problems that had led to the Tamil’s twenty-six year
separatist war.
In West Papua, indigenous political leaders continued to oppose
both an imposed state of ‘special autonomy’ and the division of the
province into two, Papua Barat and Papua, in 2006, following a failed
government attempt to divide the province in three in 2003.13 A low-
level insurgency had been in operation against Indonesian occupation
of West Papua since the mid-1960s, following the withdrawal of the
Dutch colonial administration in 1962. The territory was formally
incorporated into Indonesia via the 1969 ‘Act of Free Choice’, in which
1026 hand-picked tribal chiefs voted in front of armed soldiers to
accept integration into Indonesia (Aggelopolous 2009). Over the
following forty years, tens of thousands of indigenous West Papuans
have been killed and serious human rights violations, along with
varying degrees of protest, have continued.14
In confronting the Indonesian state, West Papua’s indigenous
political leadership suffered from division, based on tribal or clan
loyalties, degrees of public opposition to Indonesia, and ‘big man
syndrome’.15 However, in 2007 the organization of the West Papua
National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL), bringing together most
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of the separatist organizations (including the armed Free Papua
Organization  Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM), gave the liberation
movement greater coordination and coherence. The Indonesian
government, however, responded primarily by ignoring calls for a
mediated resolution to West Papua’s continuing problems, in turn
leaving grievances unaddressed.
Conclusion
In each of the case studies, the ethnic minorities in question had been
excluded from equal and consistent rule of law as full state citizens. In
part, this exclusion resulted from reactive separatist activity which in
turn allowed government agents to construct such ethnic minorities as
‘anti-state’ and hence beyond the law. However, in each of the case
studies, representative groups of the ethnic minorities had questioned
or not accepted the extent to which they had been incorporated as full
and equal citizens in the first instance, or had been compelled to
accept citizenship in ways that were structurally (economically,
politically) limiting.
In the case of Timor-Leste, this issue was resolved by the territory
achieving independence. In that there remained civic unrest, this was
ideological and communal (Kingsbury 2009) and did not represent a
separatist claim. In cases where ethnic divisions were problematic,
these were largely intended to be addressed by the devolution of state
authority to the district level. In Aceh the issue of rule of law as the
critical component of an acceptable form of citizenship was addressed
by ending the conflict, by limiting the scope and operations of security
forces, and by introducing human rights provisions and ensuring rule
of law (MOU 2005, pp. 12).
In Pattani, separatist conflict, which arose in the late 1940s
following the imposition of a particular national identity, was
escalated by the abrogation of rule of law under Thailand’s Thaksin
government. So too in Sri Lanka, Tamils were structurally excluded
from participating in the state, including access to rule of law, as a
consequence of Sinhalese being made the national language in 1956,
even with the ineffective rescinding of that law in 1988. In Mindanao’s
Muslim regions, rule of law was diminished by relatively arbitrary and
religiously-differentiated military violence, which continued to fuel
support for separatist claims, while in West Papua, indigenous
Melanesians were for the greater part effectively second-class citizens,
being subject to rule by law and its sometimes arbitrarily violent
interpretation.
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In large part, the lack of civic equity reflects a lack of accountability
by state institutions to minority groups and conversely it is invariably
when there is accountability, via a representative political process, that
rule of law has applied. This then raised the prospect of accountable
representative political processes providing a source of resolution to
ethnic minority claims, presumed in this instance to equate to more or
less substantive democracy (Grugel 2006, p. 6), but also accountability.
This means the representatives in question actually have to represent
their people in a direct sense, to be ‘of ’ them, most directly through
proximity an ethnic commonality, or devolved political responsibility.
This is especially so if there remains an inherent lack of trust in either
the capacity or intentions of central authority.
Finally, the devolution of political authority calls into question the
status of the centralized state, and raises the spectre of polities
evolving beyond Westphalian and especially centralized sovereignty
(see, for example, Ohmae 1995). In part this can be seen to have
occurred through the advent and interventions of multilateral institu-
tions such as the UN, the IMF, and the International Criminal Court.
In part, too, state sovereignty has been undermined by the ‘respon-
sibility to protect’ paradigm (UN 2009), and by the acceptance of
third-party monitoring in places such as Aceh (EU and ASEAN,
20052007), Sri Lanka (Norway, 20022007), and Mindanao (Malay-
sia and Brunei, 2004 to the present).
This article has demonstrated some common features between the
case studies. The most critical is the failure of some multi-ethnic post-
colonial states to establish citizenship based on a shared sense of civic
equity, sometimes caused and usually exacerbated by restricted
economic capacity. This failure of the state as an equitable civic
institution encourages a retreat to ethnic specificity. It suggests that a
combination of greater civic equity, in some cases combined with a
higher degree of regional autonomy, may address such separatist
claims. As states develop stronger civic institutions, apply the rule of
law, and have accountable and representative government, political
authority exists primarily to ensure civic welfare, security, and state
coordination. Having been born of fragile circumstances, some post-
colonial states have thus begun to consider loosening the ties that bind
them sometimes too tightly.
Notes
1. The notion of ‘race’ is employed here to distinguish physically distinctive peoples, e.g.,
Papuans and Malays.
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2. Eelam, as referred to by Tamil separatists; and Pattani, the former sultanate, rather
than the current province.
3. This phenomenon is discussed in relation to sub-Saharan African states in John M.
Luiz 2000 ‘The politics of state, society and economy’, International Journal of Social
Economics, vol. 27, no. 3, pp 227-243; Pierre Engelbert 2000 ‘Pre-colonial institutions, post-
colonial states, and economic development in topical Africa’, Political Research Quarterly,
vol. 53, no. 1, pp. 736; Richard Cornwall 1999 ‘The end of the post-colonial state system in
Africa?’, African Security Review, vol. 8, no. 2 ; and David D. Hirschmann 1987 ‘Early post-
colonial bureaucracy as history: the case of the Lesotho Central Planning and Development
Office, 19651975’, The International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, pp.
45570.
4. Based on personal conversation with the then GAM intelligence coordinator, Irwandi
Yusuf in September 2000.
5. Experience from this field research is cumulative, based on a wide range of experiences
variously in remote (mountain village), colonially-acculturated (predominantly urban
English, US, Portuguese, or Indonesian educated), and more cosmopolitan (externally
educated) communities in Timor-Leste (19952010), West Papua (20012010), Mindanao
(19982009), and Sri Lanka (20052010).
6. Based on experience with Acehnese who have been educated or lived abroad, with
elements of the leadership of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Acheh Merdeka  GAM),
and with Acehnese who have been, as many are, influenced by the flow of ideas from abroad,
between 2000 and 2010. Sri Lanka’s Tamils were generally better educated by and under the
British colonial authorities and continued to privilege education in both the post-colonial
state and among its diaspora. Regarding West Papuans, based on experience with West
Papuan political leadership between 2001 and 2009.
7. Regarding Timor-Leste, based on author participant observation, 19952010. Regard-
ing Aceh, Pattani, and Mindanao, based on experiences with communities in these
environments.
8. A predominantly Makassae-speaking region.
9. The term ‘Moro’ derives from the Spanish word for ‘Moors’, referring to Muslims who
arrived in Spain via Morocco in the early eighth century.
10. In 1999, 98.5 per cent of registered voters turned out for the ballot for self-
determination, with around 93 per cent voting in 2001 and 2007 (taking into account
double registration, overseas voters being excluded from the count, and dead voters not
being taken off the rolls).
11. Technically, the provincial government of Aceh controlled 70 per cent of the budget,
although in practice this reduced to somewhere between half and two-thirds.
12. The LTTE claimed that the government’s earlier promises to implement political
devolution were undermined or not implemented in practice and that it hence had negotiated
in bad faith. For its part, senior LTTE strategists (conversation with the author, Kilinochche,
May 2006) believed they could expand their claimed homeland, notably to include the major
port city of Trincomalee, before negotiating a settlement.
13. The attempt to divide the province in three was held to be unconstitutional by the
Constitutional Court, although the court accepted as fait accompli that two provinces had
been established.
14. Despite a number of well-documented massacres, there are no reliable figures on total
numbers of deaths. According to Free Papua Organization (OPM) commander Jacon Prai,
there have been an accountable 106,000 deaths in West Papua since 1962 (Prai 2000).
Budiarjo (2005) claims that ‘it is widely agreed that about 100,000 Papuans have lost their
lives as a result of military operations or occupation-related disorders since the beginning of
Indonesia rule in 1961’. Although Brundige et al. (2004) do not cite a total number of deaths
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in West Papua, they do however note that evidence ‘strongly suggests’ that the Indonesian
government has violated the 1948 Convention on Genocide.
15. This is where individuals place most emphasis on their claimed personal or charismatic
qualities of leadership rather than constructing and consolidating organizational bases.
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